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We study the dynamics of FDI entry under a setting with firm heterogeneity and FDI uncer-
tainty. The risk of FDI failure depends positively on the complexity of production technology,
negatively on the quality of infrastructure in the host country, and evolves over time with the
extent of knowledge diffusion. The incorporation of FDI uncertainty leads to a non-monotonic
relationship between technology complexity and the timing of FDI entry: firms with intermedi-
ate technology levels lead the first wave of FDI, which helps lower the investment uncertainty
facing subsequent investors and induces a wider range of FDI entry in the second period. We
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1. INTRODUCTION
Risk assessments play an important role in practice when firms decide on the location and timing of
foreign direct investment (FDI). Factors that could influence the success probability of FDI include
the quality of infrastructure in the host country, the difficulty of product quality control, and the
reliability of supply chains at the investment location. According to A.T.Kearney (2004), these
risk factors are among the most critical considerations of the CEO’s of the world’s largest 1000
companies when making FDI decisions. See Figure 1 for more information.
The literature on FDI decisions considers, however, predominantly the tradeoff between fixed
and variable costs, regardless of whether the research focus is on horizontal or vertical FDI. See,
for example, the survey by Helpman (2006). Analyses on how risk affects firms’ FDI decisions
are generally absent. Although the studies based on cost considerations offer explanations for the
question as to why some firms undertake FDI but others do not, they leave issues related to FDI
timing unaddressed. In particular, the timing of FDI entry is commonly observed to vary across
firms and depend on the development levels of the host countries. For example, for a given host-
source country pair, while some firms in an industry would forge ahead to exploit FDI opportunities,
others would take a wait-and-see attitude. Furthermore, countries with different development levels
tend to receive FDI in a given industry in a hierarchical manner. See, for example, the flying-geese
pattern documented by Feenstra and Rose (2000). Since the factors determining investment risk
are usually related to product and country characteristics and the relevance of these risk factors
evolves over time, we believe that taking into account these risk factors in firms’ FDI decisions will
help to explain the dynamics of FDI entry and enhance the prediction power of the existing models.
We build upon the recent literature on FDI entry decisions with firm heterogeneity by Antra`s
and Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al. (2004). Under the market structure of monopolistic
competition, the setup enables one to analyze the equilibrium sorting of heterogeneous firms into
different market-entry modes and organizational forms. As to be elaborated shortly, the risk factors
considered in our paper generally apply to horizontal as well as vertical FDI. We study only the
latter case and adopt a framework similar to Antra`s and Helpman (2004). We deviate from their
focus of incomplete contract, however, and concentrate instead on different aspects of FDI risk and
the effects of these risk factors on the timing of FDI entry made by heterogeneous firms.
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Specifically, we develop a dynamic North-South trade model, in which production of final goods
requires a successful matching between headquarter services and intermediate inputs. Headquarter
services are always produced in the North by final-good producers (in short, firms, hereafter). In-
termediate inputs, however, can be produced either in the North or in the South by plant operators.
Firms in the North decide whether to engage an intermediate-input plant operator in the North
via domestic vertical integration or to engage one in the South via FDI.
It is assumed that FDI is associated with a higher risk of matching failure than domestic
vertical integration. In the event of unsuccessful matching between the headquarter service and the
intermediate input, firms will not be able to sell the defective final product and have to suffer a loss
as a result. This scenario is referred to as investment failure. Thus, in addition to the higher fixed
cost associated with FDI, each firm seeking cheap labor in the South to produce the intermediate
input also has to take into account the higher risk of investment failure.
We explicitly model three main factors determining the likelihood of investment failure. They
are: (1) the quality of infrastructure in the host country, (2) the extent of knowledge diffusion, and
(3) the sophisticatedness of production technology. The first factor is country-specific, the second
industry-specific and time dependent, and the third firm-specific, as to be elaborated below.
First, as found in several empirical studies, the quality of infrastructure provision (such as
power, water, roadway, and IT) and institutions in the host country are key factors explaining the
destination of investment. See, for example, Fung et al. (2004), Wei (2000), and Cheng and Kwan
(2000) among others. This is consistent with the findings of the survey conducted by A.T.Kearney
(2004) shown in Figure 1, where government regulations, political and social disturbances, IT
disruption, and absence of rule of law are considered by firms as some of the most critical risk
factors of FDI. Given these empirical observations, we assume that the probability of investment
failure decreases with a higher quality of infrastructure or institutions in the host country.
Second, as is well recognized in the literature, FDI is an important channel for international
knowledge diffusion. See for example, Findlay (1978), Antra`s (2005), Javorcik (2004), Veugelers and
Cassiman (2004), and Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999). See also surveys by Blomstro¨m and Kokko
(1998) and Keller (2004). The evidence for positive knowledge spillover is in particular prominent
in the case of vertical FDI in which multinationals transplant advanced know-how of intermediate
input production to local suppliers in the host country. We argue that through demonstration
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effect, knowledge is diffused from these suppliers producing for multinationals to the local industry.
As a result, the industry-wide technological level improves in the host country, which helps lower
the risk of FDI failure. The extent of knowledge diffusion strengthens as the mass of multinationals
present in the local industry increases, which changes the distribution of FDI uncertainty over time.
Third, quality control is noted by CEO’s in the same survey (A.T.Kearney, 2004) as the most
critical product-specific risk associated with overseas operations. Grossman et al. (2005) also point
out that firms’ decisions to undertake FDI depend on their abilities to secure efficient and reliable
suppliers of intermediate inputs. We argue that the risk of quality control is especially threaten-
ing for firms producing sophisticated products and adopting advanced technologies, which involve
complicated operation procedures and require intensive face-to-face communications throughout
the entire designing, manufacturing, and marketing process. This argument of ours is in line with
the O-ring theory of Kremer (1993) and similar to those found in the product-cycle literature of
Vernon (1966), Antra`s (2005), and Lu (2007), among others. We further link the sophisticatedness
of firm production technology to firm productivity, based on the widespread agreement in the liter-
ature that differences in firm technology account for significant variations in firm productivity. See
for example, empirical studies by Klette (1996), Griliches (1998), and Klette and Kortum (2004),
and theoretical formalizations by Kremer (1993) and Acemoglu et al. (2006). By incorporating
both strands of literatures, we assume that other things being equal, firms of more sophisticated
production technologies are associated with not only higher productivity levels but also with higher
probabilities of FDI failure.1
Incorporating the three factors discussed above into the risk function facing each firm, our model
reaches three empirically relevant predictions. First, the risk presented by poor infrastructure in
the host country can be prohibitive and thwart all potential FDI inflows. Accordingly, a minimum
level of infrastructure in the South is necessary to make FDI viable at all. This is different from
the conventional finding in the literature that with cost-saving considerations alone, sufficiently
productive firms always find it profitable to undertake FDI.
1As argued above, in a given industry, firms employing more sophisticated technology are more productive; mean-
while, they also face higher challenge in transferring technology to a less developed South. The resulting reduced-form
assumption of a positive association between productivity and FDI risk is a convenient one. We recognize the pos-
sibility that more productive firms are more capable of “solving” quality control problems, and thus a structural
approach may be more desirable in modeling the relationship between productivity and FDI risk. The results of the
paper will remain valid, however, without the above reduced-form assumption, if risk aversion is present in the model.
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Second, the evolution of FDI risk following the diffusion of industry-specific knowledge leads
to a dynamic pattern of FDI entry, where international production migration occurs in clusters
and in orders. As shown in the paper, a first wave of FDI, if it takes place, channels production
knowledge from the North to the South and generates positive externality for subsequent investors.
As a result, industry-wide investment uncertainty decreases. The lower risk of FDI failure then
stimulates a second wave of production migration, which in turn triggers a third wave of migration.
We label this dynamic process of sequential FDI entry the “magnet effect” of FDI. The magnet
effect of FDI postulated in this paper is related to the agglomeration effect or self-reinforcing effect
documented in the empirical literature. For example, Head et al. (1995) found that the location
choice of FDI by Japanese firms in the U.S. is driven by the mass of existing Japanese firms in the
same industry. Similarly, Cheng and Kwan (2000) found that the FDI in China exhibits a strong
self-reinforcing effect: existing FDI stock in a region attracts further FDI inflows.
Third, the firm-specific risk of product quality control takes a heavier toll on more productive
firms which produce more sophisticated products. This argument, along with the fixed and variable
cost tradeoff consideration, implies a non-monotonic relationship between firm productivity and
FDI propensity: firms of intermediate productivity levels are more likely to undertake FDI than
the least and the most productive firms. This prediction presents another departure from the
common conception in the literature that more productive firms in a given industry are more likely
to undertake FDI. The conventional prediction emerges as a special case in our framework when
the risk factor is negligible.
In sum, our framework implies that firms of intermediate productivity levels will lead the first
wave of FDI, if a minimum threshold level of infrastructure in the host country is met. The first
wave of FDI then attracts a second wave of FDI entry by firms both less productive and more
productive than the pioneering batch of firms. As the process continues, the extensive margin of
firms undertaking FDI enlarges toward the lower and higher end of productivity spectrum. We
prove the existence of a stable steady state for this self-reinforcing process of magnet effect and
characterize the extensive margin of FDI at the steady state. We also derive theoretically the
change in the compositions of firms undertaking FDI at the steady state as the host-home country
characteristics change. Numerical simulations are then conducted to illustrate the equilibrium
convergent path and the comparative-static analysis results.
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Later in the paper, we provide some supporting evidence using Taiwanese firm-level data. Due
to the special historical background between Taiwan and China, FDI flows from Taiwan to China
were prohibited prior to 1990. The change of FDI policy in 1990 serves as a natural experiment
and provides us an opportunity to observe the timing of FDI entry after the ban was lifted. The
economic environment of China in the 1990s suggests that the three risk factors considered in
the paper are highly relevant. We find that the FDI entry by Taiwanese firms in the electronics
industry took place sequentially and was led by firms of intermediate productivity levels, exhibiting
a pattern which resembles the magnet effect proposed in the paper.
Our study helps to shed some light on the issue of how globalization affects industrial restructur-
ing in the source country. Our study implies that the aggregate industry productivity may increase
after FDI liberalization since firms of intermediate productivity move out but those of high produc-
tivity continue to stay in the home country, especially in industries where investment uncertainty
is highly sensitive to production technology. Our paper also suggests that subsidies offered by host
countries to attract FDI have an amplifying effect due to the magnet effect discussed above. If the
magnet effect is strong enough (say the host and home countries are close in terms of geographical
or culture and language distance), small differences between host countries in exogenous factors
(such as infrastructure levels or FDI subsidies) will lead to substantial differences in the quality
and quantity of FDI inflows.
Several papers have also made important contributions toward the understanding of investment
timing, entry, and exit under uncertainty. These include McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit (1989),
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Caballero and Pindyck (1996), and Rob and Vettas (2003) among others.
Most of these papers consider a single firm’s optimal entry decision while assuming the uncertainty
to follow some deterministic stochastic processes. Lin and Saggi (2002), on the other hand, consider
a duopoly model in which the first firm’s entry into a foreign market creates positive externality
for the later potential entrant by lowering the entry cost facing the second firm. They then explore
conditions under which simultaneous or sequential entry of the two ex-ante identical firms into the
foreign market will occur. Contrary to the above literature, we attempt to provide economic foun-
dations for the force governing the underlying distribution of uncertainty, and allow the distribution
of uncertainty to evolve over time with the endogenous knowledge diffusion. In a setting with a
continuum of firms, we are able to address how the dynamics of FDI entry and the extensive margin
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of FDI vary with the host and source country characteristics. Due to the setup of market structure
with monopolistic competition, however, strategic interactions among firms are not considered in
our paper. We leave this interesting extension for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our formulation of FDI
uncertainty and its effect on firms’ FDI decisions. In Section 3, we highlight the initial condition
for non-zero measure of firms to undertake FDI before any knowledge diffusion occurs. We then
formalize the magnet effect of FDI and prove the existence of a stable steady state for such a
self-reinforcing process. We also derive theoretically the variation in the extensive margin of FDI
at the steady state as key parameters of the model change. In Section 4, we provide simulation
results illustrating the FDI dynamic path. Section 5 presents empirical evidence supporting our
theoretical predictions. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of propositions and lemmas are shown in the
appendix.
2. THE MODEL
The world has a unit measure of population with the following preference structure:
U = x0 +
1
αj
J∑
j=1
X
αj
j , 0 < αj < 1
Xj =
[∫
xj(i)αjdi
]1/αj
,
where x0 is the numeraire, a homogeneous good produced both in the North and in the South. Labor
is the only factor of production, and the production technology of x0 exhibits constant returns to
scale; thus the labor productivity of a country in producing the numeraire good determines its
wage rate. The North is assumed to have an absolute advantage in producing the numeraire good,
and therefore commands a higher wage: wN > wS . The non-numeraire good Xj represents the
aggregate consumption of differentiated products xj(i) in sector j. The elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties within a sector (σj = 11−αj ) is allowed to differ across sectors.
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The derived inverse demand function for each variety i in sector j is:
pj(i) = xj(i)αj−1 (1)
Production of the final good xj(i) requires a successful matching between the headquarter
service, hj(i), and the intermediate input, mj(i). The headquarter service is always produced in
the North by final-good producers H; the intermediate input, however, can be produced either in
the North or in the South by plant operators M . There is an infinitely elastic supply of such plant
operators or suppliers in both locations. Final-good producers H in the North (in short, firms,
hereafter) decide whether to engage an intermediate-input supplier in the North via domestic
vertical integration or to engage one in the South via FDI. It is assumed that by integrating the
production in the North (N), there is no risk of mismatch between the headquarter service and
the intermediate input, and the output of variety i in sector j is determined by the production
technology:
xNj (i) = θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [mj(i)
1− ηj
]1−ηj
(2)
The parameter ηj denotes the intensity of the headquarter service in the production of the final good
in sector j that is common to all varieties. The higher ηj is, the more important is the headquarter
service component. The parameter θ indicates the productivity level of H in producing a variety
of the final good in sector j. As argued in the introduction, we will also use this parameter to
indicate the sophisticatedness of production technology employed by H to produce the final good.
The types of firms θ are distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(θ).
If the intermediate input is instead produced in the South (S), H faces a potential risk that
the intermediate input produced abroad may fail to match the exact specification designed by the
North. In this case, the output is zero. The production technology in this case is:
xSj (i) =
 θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [mj(i)
1−ηj
]1−ηj
, in case of FDI success;
0, in case of FDI failure.
(3)
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. In the following, we focus on one sector and suppress the
sector index to simplify the notation. By (1), (2), and (3), the revenue function for variety i given
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the amounts of inputs is:
Rl(i) = γlθα
[
h(i)
η
]αη [m(i)
1− η
]α(1−η)
, l = {N,S} (4)
where γN = 1, and 0 < γS < 1 is the probability of successful matching between the headquarter
service and the intermediate input when the latter is produced in the South.
It is assumed that the fixed organizational cost (in Northern labor units) for H to coordinate
the integration of the headquarter service and the intermediate input is higher in the case of FDI
than in the case of domestic vertical integration:
fS > fN . (5)
The production of either the headquarter service or the intermediate input is assumed to have
a unit labor requirement of one. Following AH’s assumption of incomplete contracts, H and M
negotiate the division of revenues after the inputs have been produced. The division depends on the
relative negotiating powers of the two parties and their outside options. If the negotiation fails, H
can potentially seize the intermediate input, but at the cost of a fraction (1− δ) of the final output,
regardless of whether M is located in the North or in the South. Suppose in addition that H is
able to extract a fraction β0 of the surplus from the contract with M at the ex post negotiation.
Then, the division of revenues for H is: β = δα+β0[1− δα]. Given the expected division of ex post
revenues, H and M choose the optimal production level of headquarter service and intermediate
input that maximizes their respective operating profits. This leads to a joint operating profit for
H and M , which depends on the location of M :
pil(θ, η) = γl
1
1−α θ
α
1−αψl(η)− wNf l, l = {N,S}, (6)
where
ψl(η) =
1− α[βη + (1− β)(1− η)]
{(1/α) (wN/β)η [wl/(1− β)]1−η}α/(1−α)
. (7)
Under the assumption that there is an infinitely elastic supply of potential M agents in either
location, the final-good producer H, by charging an optimal amount of up-front fee for engaging
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any of the intermediate-good supplier M , can capture the entire amount of the joint operating
profit in (6). Thus, H chooses the organizational form (between domestic vertical integration and
FDI) that will yield higher joint operating profit.
Given that wS < wN , it follows that ψS(η) > ψN (η). Thus, a firm H by undertaking FDI in
the South reaps a larger variable profit margin if the FDI venture is a success. However, the higher
variable profit margin is discounted by the potential risk of mismatch and investment failure. We
assume that the success probability of FDI takes the following form:
γS(θ) =
(
b
θ
)αz
, 0 < b ≤ θ, 0 < z, (8)
where the parameter b indicates the minimum level of firm productivity and technology sophis-
tication in an industry, and the parameter z characterizes the industry-specific elasticity of FDI
success probability to technology sophistication. For example, given the same θ, some industries
(such as the electronics or automobile industry) may be more sensitive to risk than others (such as
the apparel or furniture industry). Within the same industry, z may also change over time as the
‘general’ technology of the industry becomes more standardized at the FDI destination. For a given
z, the FDI success probability decreases with the sophisticatedness of production technology. The
larger z is, the more negatively affected is the FDI success probability by a higher level of technol-
ogy sophistication. By normalization, the success probability equals one for the least sophisticated
variety and approaches zero as the technology sophistication level approaches infinity.
Define θ˜ = θ
α
1−α , and b˜ = b
α
1−α . It follows that
piS(θ˜, z) = ψS b˜z θ˜1−z − wNfS , (9)
piN (θ˜) = ψN θ˜ − wNfN . (10)
Equation (9) implies that the expected profit of undertaking FDI is increasing and concave in θ˜ for
0 < z < 1 and (weakly) decreasing in θ˜ for z ≥ 1. In the latter case, as firm productivity increases,
the positive effect of a larger market share on variable profits is more than offset by the negative
effect of a higher risk of investment failure. This formulation includes the framework of Antra`s and
Helpman (2004) as a special case when the risk of FDI failure approaches zero. To see this, note
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that limz→0 γS = 1 and limz→0 piS(θ˜, z)→ p˜iS(θ˜) ≡ ψS θ˜ − wNfS .
Assumption 1 The parameters satisfy the conditions that (i) b˜ < w
NfN
ψN
; (ii) f
N
ψN
< f
S
ψS
.
Define θ˜N ≡ wNfNψN , θ˜S ≡ w
NfS
ψS
, and θ˜NS ≡ w
N (fS−fN )
ψS−ψN . They correspond respectively to the
productivity level with which a firm will break even by engaging a plant operator in the North,
by engaging one in the South, and be indifferent between the two, under the scenario without
FDI risk. Assumption 1 implies θ˜N < θ˜NS . Thus, without FDI uncertainty, firms are partitioned
according to their productivity levels into the least productive ones who do not produce, the less
productive ones who engage plant operators in the North, and the most productive ones who engage
plant operators in the South. Thus, by making Assumption 1, we assume that the production of
intermediate components in the North is not competed away by the South, even in the scenario
that is most favorable to FDI.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique z∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the curve piS is tangent
to piN , and
(i) for all z ∈ (0, z∗), ∃ {θ˜0, θ˜1} = {θ˜|piS(θ˜, z) − piN (θ˜) = 0}, where θ˜NS < θ˜0 < θ˜1, such that
piS(θ˜, z) > piN (θ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1), and piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜0) ∪ (θ˜1,∞);
(ii) for all z ∈ (z∗,∞), piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is shown in the appendix.
Lemma 1 indicates that the expected profit of undertaking FDI can be severely affected by the
risk of FDI failure such that no firms stand to gain from FDI. The value z∗ defines the critical
threshold of risk elasticity. The risk elasticity must be sufficiently small (z < z∗) for FDI to take
place. The sketch of the proof of Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, productivity levels
θ˜ are indicated on the horizontal axis and expected profits on the vertical axis. A typical piS(θ˜, z)
curve starts at the vertical intercept piS = −wNfS and passes through Point “A” in the figure where
θ˜ = b˜. As z approaches zero, the curve piS(θ˜, z) approaches the schedule p˜iS(θ˜) = ψS θ˜ − wNfS ,
which lies above the schedule piN (θ˜) = ψN θ˜ − wNfN for all θ˜ ≥ θ˜NS . Define piSz (θ˜, z) ≡ ∂pi
S(θ˜,z)
∂z to
obtain
piSz (θ˜, z) = ψ
S b˜z θ˜1−z ln(
b˜
θ˜
). (11)
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Observe that piSz (θ˜, z) Q 0 for θ˜ R b˜. Thus, as z increases from zero, the curve piS(θ˜, z) rotates
clockwise around Point “A”. As z → 1, the curve piS(θ˜, z) approaches a step function with piS =
−wNfS for θ˜ = 0 and piS = ψS b˜ − wNfS for all θ˜ > 0. This function falls below the schedule
piN (θ˜) completely for all θ˜ ≥ b˜ by Assumption 1. It follows from the above derivations that
there exists a unique z∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the curve piS(θ˜, z) is tangent to the schedule piN (θ˜).
For z ∈ (0, z∗), the curve piS(θ˜, z) intersects with the schedule piN (θ˜) twice, at θ˜0 and θ˜1, with
both of them necessarily larger than θ˜NS . By the concavity of the curve piS(θ˜, z), it follows that
piS(θ˜, z) > piN (θ˜) > piN (θ˜NS) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1), and that piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) otherwise. For
z ∈ (z∗,∞), the curve piS(θ˜, z) falls completely below the schedule piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ≥ b˜; thus,
piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜), for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
Proposition 2 For z ∈ (0, z∗), firms are partitioned according to their productivity levels as fol-
lows:
(i) firms with θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜N ] exit the market;
(ii) firms with θ˜ ∈ [θ˜N , θ˜0] ∪ [θ˜1,∞) undertake domestic vertical integration in the North;
(iii) firms with θ˜ ∈ [θ˜0, θ˜1] undertake FDI in the South.
On the other hand, for z ∈ (z∗,∞), FDI is not viable:
(i) firms with θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜N ] exit the market;
(ii) firms with θ˜ ∈ [θ˜N ,∞) undertake domestic vertical integration in the North.
Proof of Proposition 2. The results follow immediately from Lemma 1 and the definition of θ˜N .
Proposition 2 indicates that as the risk elasticity becomes sufficiently low and falls below the thresh-
old level (z < z∗), firms of intermediate productivity levels relocate the production of intermediate
inputs to the South, while the least and the most productive firms remain to have them produced in
the North. This implies a non-monotonic relationship between firm productivity and FDI propen-
sity. This is contrary to the AH prediction, where the most productive firms are most likely to
undertake FDI. The reason for the least productive firms to keep the production line in the North
is similar to the argument under the AH setting: firms with smaller market shares find the variable
profit gain from lower wages in the South not sufficient to offset the higher fixed organizational
cost associated with FDI. In the current model, the incentive to locate the production line in the
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South is further weakened by the possibility of FDI failure; thus, the set of lower productive firms
to keep the production line in the North is larger (θ˜NS < θ˜0). On the other hand, the risk of FDI
failure accounts for the prediction that the most productive firms also refrain from relocating the
production line to the South. As these firms with larger market shares are also engaged in varieties
of more sophisticated technology, they face higher possibilities of FDI failure associated with their
products. The wage advantage offered by the South is more than offset by the expected loss of FDI
failure when the sophistication level of the engaged technology is sufficiently high (θ˜ > θ˜1).
Proposition 3 For z ∈ (0, z∗),
(i) the lower bound of the range of firms undertaking FDI, θ˜0, increases with z,
(ii) the upper bound of the range of firms undertaking FDI, θ˜1, decreases with z, and
(iii) the range of firms undertaking FDI, (θ˜1 − θ˜0), decreases with z; in particular, as z → 0,
(θ˜1 − θ˜0)→∞ and as z → z∗, (θ˜1 − θ˜0)→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is shown in the appendix.
The results are quite intuitive. As the risk elasticity z decreases, the FDI success probability
increases for all firms. The marginal firms which were indifferent between FDI and domestic vertical
integration, now find it profitable to relocate the production line to the South as FDI now offers
higher expected variable profits. The range of firms undertaking FDI enlarges and approaches the
scenario of AH (θ˜0 → θ˜NS and θ˜1 →∞) as FDI risk vanishes.
3. THE DYNAMICS OF FDI
In this section, we extend the static model introduced above to a dynamic setting with multiple time
periods to identify the timing of FDI entry by heterogeneous firms and to formalize the magnet effect
of FDI. Variables introduced previously are now indexed by time subscripts to indicate their values
at the applicable time period. The dynamics arise from the endogenous diffusion of knowledge from
the multinational to the local industry in the host country: the presence of some initial FDI in an
industry generates industry-specific knowledge diffusion from the North to the South and lowers
the industry’s risk elasticity for a subsequent period. Specifically, the risk elasticity zt is assumed
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to evolve according to the following dynamics:
zt =
1
K + Tt−1
, K ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, . . . (12)
where the parameter K indicates the level of infrastructure in the South, which is shared by
all industries. The variable Tt−1 represents the accumulated level of industry-specific knowledge
diffused from the North to the South in period t−1. The level of infrastructure encompasses various
aspects of a nation’s capacity to support general production activities. This includes physical
infrastructure, social capital, human capital, and governance infrastructure. Equation (12) implies
that the higher the level of infrastructure in the South, the lower the risk elasticity for all industries
to undertake FDI in the South. The risk elasticity for an industry is further lowered if the presence of
FDI undertaken by firms in the same industry in previous periods leads to knowledge diffusion from
the North to the South and improves the production capacity of the intermediate-input suppliers
in the South. Equation (12) implies that the larger the amount of industry-specific knowledge
diffused from the North to the South, the lower the risk elasticity of the industry. In particular, the
accumulated level of industry-specific knowledge diffused from the North to the South in period t
is defined as:
Tt =
G˜(θ˜1,t)− G˜(θ˜0,t)
d
, d > 0, (13)
where θ˜0,t and θ˜1,t indicate the lower and upper bound of the range of firms undertaking FDI
in period t, and G˜(θ˜) is the transformed cumulative distribution function expressed in terms of
the scaled productivity level θ˜. In (13), the magnitude G˜(θ˜1,t) − G˜(θ˜0,t) represents the absolute
mass of firms with intermediate-input production located in the South in period t. It is scaled
by the economic distance, d, between the host and home country of FDI. The economic distance,
d, summarizes the barriers to knowledge diffusion arising from physical distance, and cultural,
language, and institutional differences. For a given absolute mass of firms with FDI in the South,
the effective mass and the extent of knowledge diffusion it creates is larger, the closer the two
countries are in terms of their economic distance.
Begin with an initial period (t = 0) when FDI is not present in the South (T0 = 0). In this
case, the level of infrastructure in the South is the only determinant of the risk elasticity z, and of
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the viability of FDI, in the industry.
Corollary 4
(i) The minimum level of infrastructure required of the South to trigger the first wave of FDI is
K∗ = 1/z∗.
(ii) For K > K∗, the range of the first wave of FDI, (θ˜1,1− θ˜0,1), is larger, the higher is the level
of infrastructure, K, in the South; in particular, dθ˜1,1/dK > 0 and dθ˜0,1/dK < 0.
Proof of Corollary 4. The result in (i) follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that T0 = 0. The result
in (ii) follows from Proposition 3 and the fact that z1 = 1/K.
The importance of the recipient country’s infrastructure in attracting FDI inflows has been doc-
umented by various empirical studies. For example, Wei (2000) examined the depressing effect
of corruption on inward FDI. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) estimated the minimum threshold
of infrastructure that a recipient country must achieve to attract positive flows of FDI from the
United States.
If the South meets the minimum threshold of infrastructure (K > K∗), Corollary 4 applies and
firms with θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0,1, θ˜1,1) undertake FDI in period 1. By (12) and (13), the knowledge diffusion
created by these firms helps lower the risk elasticity in period 2 (z2 < z1, as T1 > T0 = 0). Thus,
earlier FDI creates positive externality for subsequent FDI. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where
the curve piS(θ˜;K,Tt−1) tilts upward at t = 2. Firms with productivity levels in the range of
(θ˜0,1− ², θ˜0,1) or (θ˜1,1, θ˜1,1+ ²), who find it not profitable to undertake FDI in period 1, now prefer
moving the production process to the South, since the risk associated with FDI is lower than before.
As a result, the first wave of production migration induces a second wave of production migration,
(θ˜0,1, θ˜1,1) ⊂ (θ˜0,2, θ˜1,2), the effective mass of FDI firms is enlarged, and the resulting knowledge
diffusion strengthened, T2 > T1 > T0 = 0. The larger mass of FDI firms further reduces the FDI
uncertainty and triggers another wave of FDI. We label this phenomenon the “magnet effect” of
FDI. This dynamic process can be summarized by the sequence
{
(θ˜1,t, θ˜0,t, zt)
}∞
t=1
which satisfies
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the following system of equations:
piS(θ˜1,t, zt)− piN (θ˜1,t) = 0 t = 1, 2, . . . (14)
piS(θ˜0,t, zt)− piN (θ˜0,t) = 0 t = 1, 2, . . . (15)
zt − 1
K + d−1G˜(θ˜1,t−1)− d−1G˜(θ˜0,t−1)
= 0 t = 2, 3, . . . (16)
with the initial condition that z1 = 1/K < z∗.
Proposition 5 There exists a stable steady-state solution (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c) to the system (14)–(16).
Proof of Proposition 5. As we focus on the steady state, the time subscript will be omitted in the
following proof. Let θ˜1(z) and θ˜0(z) indicate the solutions to (14) and (15) as functions of z. Thus,
(13) can be re-expressed as:
T (z) =
G˜(θ˜1(z))− G˜(θ˜0(z))
d
(17)
On the other hand, at the steady state, (16) reduces to:
z(T ) =
1
K + T
(18)
These two functions are illustrated in Diagram (a) of Figure 4. Define z ≡ 1
K+d−1(1−G˜(θ˜NS)) . Note
that z(0) = 1/K, where 1/K < z∗ by default such that a first wave of FDI occurs and (14)–(15)
apply. Next, note that z(1−G˜(θ˜NS)d ) = z, which is the minimum value that z can possibly take and
which occurs if θ˜1 → ∞ and θ˜0 → θ˜NS . Finally, note that z(T ) is a decreasing convex function of
T .
On the other hand, note that T (z∗) = 0 and T (z) < 1−G˜(θ˜NS)d . The former result follows from
Proposition 3 (iii). The latter result follows from the fact that at z > 0, the curve piS(θ˜, z) is still
concave and will hence intersect with piN (θ˜) at finite θ˜1 and at θ˜0 > θ˜NS , leading to G˜(θ˜1(z)) < 1
and G˜(θ˜0(z)) > G˜(θ˜NS). Recall that dθ˜0/dz > 0 and dθ˜1/dz < 0 by Proposition 3(i) and 3(ii).
This implies that dT/dz < 0. Thus, T (z) is a monotonically decreasing function of z.
The above characterizations of T (z) and z(T ) are captured in Diagram (a) of Figure 4, where z
is expressed along the horizontal axis and T the vertical axis. We note that the curve T (z) crosses
the curve z(T ) from below. The intersection of the two curves defines the steady-state level zc,
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which implies the corresponding steady-state level of (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0). If there is a deviation from the steady
state, for example, at Point “B” in Diagram (a), the system converges back to the steady-state
level zc. Thus, the steady state is also stable.
In Diagram (b), a more general scenario is illustrated, where the curve T (z) is still monotonically
decreasing in z but intersects with the curve z(T ) more than once. In this case, we note that there
must be an odd number of steady-state solutions and more than one of them are stable. In fact,
if the system starts from z = 1/K as is the case in our dynamic setting, the stable steady state
closer to z = 1/K is the realized steady state, which is represented by Point “I” in Diagram (b).
To conclude, there always exists a stable steady-state triplet (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c) which solves the system
(14)–(16).
The above proposition indicates that the “magnet effect” in attracting new waves of FDI will
die out eventually, instead of strengthening indefinitely, so that the dynamic process converges to
a stable steady state. At the steady state, a finite range of firms engage in FDI, and the relocation
of production from the North to the South ceases.
Lemma 6 At a stable steady state (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c) of the system (14)–(16), the following holds:
λc ≡ (zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c1)
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
1, z
c)
− (zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c0)
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
0, z
c) < 1. (19)
where piSθ ≡ ∂pi
S(θ˜,z)
∂θ˜
.
Proof of Lemma 6. The proof is shown in the appendix.
Note that piSθ (θ˜1, z) − ψN < 0 and that piSθ (θ˜0, z) − ψN > 0, which follow from the fact that the
curve piS(θ˜, z) crosses the schedule piN (θ˜) from below at θ˜0 and from above at θ˜1. Recall as well
that piSz (θ˜, z) < 0 for all θ˜ > b˜. Thus, λ defined at any given (θ˜1, θ˜0, z) is a positive number. In
particular, λ represents the secondary change to the risk elasticity z following a prior change in
z. To see this, note that in (19),
∣∣∣[piSθ (θ˜1, z)− ψN ]−1piSz (θ˜1, z)∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣[piSθ (θ˜0, z)− ψN ]−1piSz (θ˜0, z)∣∣∣
measure respectively the increase in θ˜1 and the decrease in θ˜0 following a decrease in z. The terms
preceding them, z2d−1G˜′(θ˜1) and z2d−1G˜′(θ˜0), then measure respectively how the increase in θ˜1
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and the decrease in θ˜0 strengthen the knowledge diffusion T and further reduce the risk elasticity
z. In other words, λ is the magnet power in terms of z in each wave of FDI. Lemma 6 indicates
that for a steady state to be stable, a small shock to z must not magnify itself (λc < 1), so that
the accumulated magnet effect (on z) given any shock to the system is finite (at (1− λc)−1).
Proposition 7 The stable steady-state value of (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c) varies with the underlying parameters
(K, d, fS , fN , wS) in the following definite directions:
(i) dθ˜c1 /dK > 0, dθ˜
c
0 /dK < 0, dz
c/dK < 0;
(ii) dθ˜c1 /dd < 0, dθ˜
c
0 / dd > 0, dz
c/dd > 0;
(iii) dθ˜c1 /df
S < 0, dθ˜c0 /df
S > 0, dzc/dfS > 0;
(iv) dθ˜c1 /df
N > 0, dθ˜c0 /df
N < 0, dzc/dfN < 0;
(v) dθ˜c1 /dw
S < 0, dθ˜c0 / dw
S > 0, dzc/dwS > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is shown in the appendix.
The stated effects of the listed parameters in Proposition 7 are as expected. A better infrastructure
in the South (larger K) and a lower barrier to knowledge diffusion (smaller d) decrease the FDI
risk elasticity and increase the FDI success probability for all firms. This leads to a larger range of
firms undertaking FDI at the steady state, and as a result, a lower level of FDI risk elasticity at the
steady state. On the other hand, as the fixed organizational cost associated with FDI (domestic
vertical integration) decreases (increases), or as the wage rate in the South falls, the balance tilts
toward FDI and a larger range of firms find it more profitable to locate the production line in the
South. With the larger presence of FDI in the South at the steady state, the FDI risk elasticity is
also lower.
4. SIMULATION
In this section, we conduct simulations to illustrate the equilibrium convergent path and the magnet
effect of FDI introduced above. By varying the parameter values, we will also illustrate the effects
of such changes on the steady-state level (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0) as proposed in Proposition 7. We choose a Pareto
distribution with shape k for the cumulative distribution function G(θ), i.e., G(θ) = 1−(b/θ)k. This
corresponds to a transformed cumulative distribution function G˜(θ˜) = 1−
(
b˜/θ˜
)k˜
, with k˜ ≡ 1−αα k.
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We choose the following parameter values for our benchmark case: wN = 4, wS = 1, fN = 1, fS =
2, α = 0.5, δ = 0.64, β0 = 0.5, η = 0.6, b = 100, K = 5, k = 1, and d = 1. Substituting them into
(7), one can derive ψN and ψS and verify that Assumption 1 holds. Given the parameter values,
the time path of {(θ0,t, θ1,t)}∞t=1 can be derived by iteration according to the system (14)–(16). The
result for the benchmark case is shown in the middle panels of Figures 5–9.
We perturb the values of the following parameters q ∈ {K, d, fS , fN , wS} with respect to the
benchmark case and derive the corresponding time path of (θ0,t, θ1,t). For each parameter, two
alternative values are tried to illustrate the effect of an increase and a decrease in the corresponding
parameter value. We discuss the results for each of the parameters in turn.
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the level of infrastructure in the South on the transition dynamics
and the steady-state level of FDI. The parameter K is perturbed as follows: K = {5.25, 5, 4.75}.
The results indicate that a better infrastructure in the South attracts a wider range of intermediate
firms in the first wave of international production migration, which in turn creates larger externality
and leads to a bigger second wave of international production migration. At the steady state, a wider
range of intermediate firms undertake FDI in the South that has a higher level of infrastructure.
It is straightforward to see that if the level of infrastructure in the South falls significantly below
K = 4.75, the first wave of FDI will not start at all.
The next case demonstrates the effect of the economic distance between the host and the home
country of FDI. We vary the parameter d according to: d = {10, 1, 0.5}. The results are shown
in Figure 6. Conditional on the same level of infrastructure in the South, K, the same range of
firms undertake FDI in the first wave of international production migration. However, given the
same absolute mass of firms with production plants in the South in the first period, a shorter
distance between the host and the home country facilitates greater knowledge diffusion and leads
to a larger subsequent wave of international production migration. At the steady state, a wider
range of intermediate firms undertake FDI in the South that is closer to the North.
The next two experiments look at how the extent of FDI is affected by the relative fixed cost of
different organizational forms. The experiments are fS = {2.05, 2, 1.95} and fN = {1.08, 1, 0.92},
respectively. The results in Figure 7 demonstrate that the required fixed organizational cost to
have the intermediate input produced in the South is negatively correlated with the extent of FDI.
As fS increases, a smaller range of intermediate firms undertake FDI in the first wave of migration.
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The effect then propagates to the subsequent waves of migration. At the steady state, a smaller
range of intermediate firms undertake FDI in the South that requires a higher fixed organizational
cost. Figure 8 shows that the fixed organizational cost of having the intermediate input produced
in the North has exactly the opposite effect. As fN increases, a larger range of intermediate firms
relocate the production of intermediate inputs to the South in the first wave of migration. The
trend continues until the steady state is reached.
Figure 9 illustrates the effect of wages in the South, wS , on the extent of FDI. The variation for
this parameter is: wS = {1.02, 1, 0.9}. As shown by the figure, the higher the wage in the South
is, the smaller is the range of intermediate firms undertaking FDI in the first period. The intuition
is straightforward: as wS increases, the expected profit for all firms by locating production in the
South decreases, which in turn reduces the FDI incentive. Via the magnet effect, a smaller range
of firms undertake FDI at the steady state.
5. EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
The non-monotonic relationship between firm productivity and FDI propensity is observed in a
sample of Taiwanese firms over a period of 15 years since 1991 when the Taiwanese government
lifted the ban on westward FDI in mainland China. The details are shown in Figure 10. In the
figure, the timing of the first-time FDI undertaken by a Taiwanese firm, measured as the number of
quarters elapsed since 1991, is indicated along the vertical axis, and the (standardized) productivity
level of a firm along the horizontal axis. A total number of 492 firms in the electronics industry
are sampled.
The firms in the sample are firms listed on either the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation or the
Over the Counter market. We compile the information on the timing of FDI for each firm based
on the Foreign Direct Investment Database published by Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank
(TEJ) and the Yearly Report published by the Investment Commissions, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Taiwan. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between vertical and horizontal FDI. The
productivity of a firm is measured by the ratio of Return on Assets (ROA). We take the average of
the ratios for a firm between 1991 and 1993, as an indication of a firm’s initial productivity level.
The ROA data are taken from the TEJ Financial Statement Database.
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As shown in the figure, the firms with intermediate productivity levels tend to undertake FDI
earlier than the most and the least productive firms. This finding contradicts the conventional
perception that higher-productivity firms have a higher tendency to undertake FDI than lower-
productivity firms. The figure also suggests that the range of intermediate firms who undertake
FDI expands over time, resembling a ‘tornado cloud’. This dynamic feature echoes our simulation
results.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the literature on the dynamics of FDI entry. In a setting with heteroge-
neous firms, we investigate the role of uncertainty in firms’ FDI decision and economic factors that
determine the distribution of FDI uncertainty. It is hypothesized that FDI uncertainty depends on
the level of infrastructure in the host country, the technology sophisticatedness of the transplanted
product, and the mass of pre-existing firms with FDI experience.
The paper reaches the following predictions on the timing of FDI entry. First, FDI entry is not
automatic and will occur only with a sufficiently high level of infrastructure in the host country.
Second, a non-monotonic correlation is identified between the technology sophisticatedness of the
product that a firm produces and the firm’s optimal timing of FDI entry. Third, the presence
of pioneering firms with FDI experience will help lower the overall investment uncertainty, by
channeling industry-specific knowledge from the North to the South, and trigger consecutive waves
of FDI entry. The strength of knowledge diffusion depends on cultural or language barriers and
geographical distance. This implies that the self-reinforcing effect of FDI entry will vary across
home-host country pairs. These predictions generated by the model are plausibly testable.
We conclude with some policy implications of our analysis: first, FDI liberalization may lead to
an increase in the average industry productivity of the home country, since firms of intermediate
productivity move out but those of high productivity continue to stay, especially in industries where
investment uncertainty is highly sensitive to the sophisticatedness of production technology; second,
the self-reinforcing effect may help explain why some small differences in the characteristics of host
countries (such as infrastructure or FDI subsidies) can lead to substantial differences in the quality
and quantity of FDI inflows; finally, the analysis in the paper suggests that the required provision
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of incentives (such as subsidies or tax exemptions) by host countries to attract FDI is non-linear
in the technological level of firms and varies over time as the knowledge diffusion takes place.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 1. Define θ˜+ such that ∂pi
S
∂θ˜
|θ˜=θ˜+ = ∂pi
N
∂θ˜
|θ˜=θ˜+ ; that is, θ˜+ is the productivity level
where the two curves piS and piN have the same slope. It is straightforward to verify that
θ˜+ = b˜
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]1/z
for z < 1.
Thus, θ˜+ ≥ b˜ if and only if z ≤ 1− ψN
ψS
≡ z¯.
(i) For 0 < z < z¯, the difference between the two curves at θ˜+ is
piS(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+) = z
1− z θ˜
+ψN − wN (fS − fN ).
Define φ(z) ≡ z1−z θ˜+ and g(z) ≡ 1−zz . It is straightforward to show that
∂θ˜+
∂z
=
∂lnθ˜+
∂z
θ˜+
=
{
− 1
z2
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]
− 1
z(1− z)
}
θ˜+ < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (1 − z) ψS
ψN
> 1 for 0 < z < z¯. Because
limz→0 θ˜+ →∞ and limz→0 g(z)→∞, by L’Hoˆpital rule,
lim
z→0
φ(z) = lim
z→0
∂θ˜+/∂z
∂g(z)/∂z
= lim
z→0
{
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]
+
z
1− z
}
θ˜+ →∞.
Thus,
lim
z→0
piS(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+)→∞.
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On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that limz→z¯ φ(z) = z¯1−z¯ b˜ =
ψS−ψN
ψN
b˜. Therefore,
lim
z→z¯ pi
S(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+) = b˜(ψS − ψN )− wN (fS − fN ) < 0,
where the last inequality follows by Assumption 1. Finally, observe that for 0 < z < z¯,
∂φ(z)
∂z
=
[
∂lnθ˜+
∂z
− ∂ln g(z)
∂z
]
φ(z)
=
{
− 1
z2
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]
− 1
z(1− z) +
1
z(1− z)
}
φ(z)
=
{
− 1
z2
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]}
φ(z) < 0.
Therefore,
∂
[
piS(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+)
]
/∂z < 0.
In summary, as z → 0, piS(θ˜, z) becomes linear, and θ˜+ → ∞. The difference between piS(θ˜, z)
and piN (θ˜) at θ˜ = θ˜+ approaches infinity. As z increases, θ˜+ decreases and the difference between
piS(θ˜+, z) and piN (θ˜+) also decreases monotonically. At z = z¯, θ˜+ = b˜ and the difference between
piS(θ˜+, z) and piN (θ˜+) becomes negative. Therefore, there must exist a unique z∗ ∈ (0, z¯) such that
piS(θ˜+, z∗)− piN (θ˜+) = 0. In other words, the curve piS(θ˜, z) is tangent to piN (θ˜) at z = z∗.
For z ∈ (0, z∗), piS(θ˜+, z) − piN (θ˜+) > 0. Thus, the curve piS(θ˜, z) must have intersected with
the line piN (θ˜) twice. Label the corresponding productivity levels θ˜0 and θ˜1 with θ˜0 < θ˜1, such
that piS(θ˜, z) − piN (θ˜) = 0 at θ˜ = {θ˜0, θ˜1}. Then it follows from the concavity of piS(θ˜, z) that
piS(θ˜, z) − piN (θ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1). Next, note that for z > 0, the curve piS(θ˜, z) falls below
the line p˜iS(θ˜) = ψS θ˜ − wNfS , which intersects with the line piN (θ˜) at θ˜NS . Thus, it must be the
case that θ˜0 > θ˜NS for z > 0. Moreover, because θ˜0 > θ˜N , it follows that piN (θ˜) > 0 for θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1).
Therefore, piS(θ˜, z) > piN (θ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1), where θ˜NS < θ˜0 < θ˜1. It also follows from the
concavity of piS(θ˜, z) that piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜0) ∪ (θ˜1,∞).
(ii) For z∗ < z < z¯, the curve piS(θ˜, z) falls completely below the line piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
Thus, piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
For z¯ ≤ z < 1, θ˜+ ≤ b˜, and because ∂piS
∂θ˜
is decreasing in θ˜, it follows that ∂pi
S
∂θ˜
< ∂pi
N
∂θ˜
, for all
θ˜ > b˜. In addition, piS(b˜, z) < piN (b˜) by Assumption 1. It follows that piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all
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θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
For z ≥ 1, the curve piS(θ˜, z) is (weakly) decreasing in θ˜. Given that piS(b˜, z) < piN (b˜) by
Assumption 1, it follows that piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
The desired result in (ii) therefore follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that by definition,
piS(θ˜1, z)− piN (θ˜1) = 0 (20)
piS(θ˜0, z)− piN (θ˜0) = 0 (21)
with θ˜0 < θ˜1. Take total derivatives of (20) and (21) with respect to θ˜1, θ˜0 and z and define
piSθ ≡ ∂pi
S(θ˜,z)
∂θ˜
. We obtain
dθ˜1/dz = −
[
piSθ (θ˜1, z)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜1, z) < 0 (22)
dθ˜0/dz = −
[
piSθ (θ˜0, z)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜0, z) > 0 (23)
where the inequalities follow from the fact that (piSθ (θ˜1, z) − ψN ) < 0, (piSθ (θ˜0, z) − ψN ) > 0 and
that piSz (θ˜, z) < 0 for all θ˜ > b˜. The results (22) and (23) imply that d(θ˜1 − θ˜0)/dz < 0. As z → 0,
piS(θ˜, z)→ p˜iS(θ˜) = ψS θ˜ − wNfS ; thus θ˜0 → θ˜NS and θ˜1 →∞. On the other hand, as z → z∗, the
curve piS(θ˜, z) becomes tangent to the line piN (θ˜); thus, θ˜0 → θ˜1.
Proof of Lemma 6. Refer to Figure 4. Note that at a stable steady state, the curve T (z) crosses
the curve z(T ) from below. Thus, at a stable steady state, the slope of T (z) in absolute value is
smaller than the slope of z−1(T ) in absolute value, where z−1(T ) denotes the inverse function of
z(T ). It is straightforward to see that z−1(T ) is T = 1/z −K. It follows that at a stable steady
state (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c),
|slope of T (z)| < ∣∣slope of z−1(T )∣∣
⇒
∣∣∣d−1G˜′(θ˜c1) (dθ˜c1/dz)− d−1G˜′(θ˜c0) (dθ˜c0/dz)∣∣∣ < ∣∣−1/(zc)2∣∣
⇒ −d−1G˜′(θ˜c1) (dθ˜c1/dz) + d−1G˜′(θ˜c0) (dθ˜c0/dz) < 1/(zc)2
⇒ −(zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c1) (dθ˜c1/dz) + (zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c0) (dθ˜c0/dz) < 1.
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Substitute dθ˜c1/dz and dθ˜
c
0/dz with the expressions from (22) and (23), and evaluate them at the
steady-state value (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c). The desired result (19) follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. At the steady state, the system (14)–(16) becomes
piS(θ˜c1, z
c)− piN (θ˜c1) = 0 (24)
piS(θ˜c0, z
c)− piN (θ˜c0) = 0 (25)
zc − 1
K + d−1G˜(θ˜c1)− d−1G˜(θ˜c0)
= 0 (26)
(i) and (ii): Let q ∈ {K, d} represent the parameter of interest. Taking total derivatives of the
system (24)–(26) with respect to (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c) and q, we obtain:

piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN 0 piSz (θ˜c1, zc)
0 piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN piSz (θ˜c0, zc)
(zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c1) −(zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c0) 1


dθ˜c1
dθ˜c0
dzc
 =

0
0
(∂zc/∂q)dq
 . (27)
Express dθ˜c1 and dθ˜
c
0 in terms of dz
c using the first two rows of (27) and substitute them into the
third row. We obtain,
(1− λc) dzc = (∂zc/∂q)dq. (28)
Given that ∂zc/∂K = −(zc)2 < 0, it follows that
dzc/dK = (1− λc)−1(∂zc/∂K) < 0, (29)
dθ˜c1/dK = (dθ˜
c
1/dz
c)(dzc/dK) > 0, (30)
dθ˜c0/dK = (dθ˜
c
0/dz
c)(dzc/dK) < 0, (31)
where we have used Lemma 6 and Equations (22) and (23). Similarly, given that ∂zc/∂d =
(zc)2d−2[G˜(θ˜c1)− G˜(θ˜c0)] > 0, it follows that
dzc/dd = (1− λc)−1(∂zc/∂d) > 0, (32)
dθ˜c1/dd = (dθ˜
c
1/dz
c)(dzc/dd) < 0, (33)
dθ˜c0/dd = (dθ˜
c
0/dz
c)(dzc/dd) > 0, (34)
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by Lemma 6 and Equations (22) and (23).
(iii)–(v): Let q ∈ {fS , fN , wS} represent the parameter of interest. Taking total derivatives of
the system (24)–(26) with respect to (θ˜c1, θ˜
c
0, z
c) and q, we obtain:

piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN 0 piSz (θ˜c1, zc)
0 piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN piSz (θ˜c0, zc)
(zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c1) −(zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c0) 1


dθ˜c1
dθ˜c0
dzc
 =

−
[
piSq (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− piNq (θ˜c1)
]
dq
−
[
piSq (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− piNq (θ˜c0)
]
dq
0
(35)
Express dθ˜c1 and dθ˜
c
0 in terms of dz
c and dq using the first two rows of (35) and substitute them
into the third row. We obtain
(1− λc) dzc = (zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c1)
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSq (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− piNq (θ˜c1)
]
dq
− (zc)2d−1G˜′(θ˜c0)
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSq (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− piNq (θ˜c0)
]
dq
≡ Ωcqdq
In the case of the parameter fS , given that
[
piS
fS
(θ˜, z)− piN
fS
(θ˜)
]
= −wN < 0, it follows that
Ωc
fS
> 0. Furthermore, using Lemma 6 and the system (35), we have
dzc/dfS = (1− λc)−1ΩcfS > 0 (36)
dθ˜c1/df
S = −
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
1, z
c) dzc/dfS
−
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSfS (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− piNfS (θ˜c1)
]
< 0 (37)
dθ˜c0/df
S = −
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
0, z
c) dzc/dfS
−
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSfS (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− piNfS (θ˜c0)
]
> 0. (38)
In the case of the parameter fN , given that
[
piS
fN
(θ˜, z)− piN
fN
(θ˜)
]
= wN > 0, it follows that
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Ωc
fN
< 0. Similarly, by using Lemma 6 and the system (35), we obtain:
dzc/dfN = (1− λc)−1ΩcfN < 0 (39)
dθ˜c1/df
N = −
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
1, z
c) dzc/dfN
−
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSfN (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− piNfN (θ˜c1)
]
> 0 (40)
dθ˜c0/df
N = −
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
0, z
c) dzc/dfN
−
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSfN (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− piNfN (θ˜c0)
]
< 0. (41)
In the case of the parameter wS , given that
[
piS
wS
(θ˜, z)− piN
wS
(θ˜)
]
= − (1−η)α
wS(1−α)ψ
S b˜z θ˜1−z < 0, it
follows that Ωc
wS
> 0. Using Lemma 6 and the system (35) again, we have:
dzc/dwS = (1− λc)−1ΩcwS > 0 (42)
dθ˜c1/dw
S = −
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
1, z
c) dzc/dwS
−
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSwS (θ˜
c
1, z
c)− piNwS (θ˜c1)
]
< 0 (43)
dθ˜c0/dw
S = −
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1
piSz (θ˜
c
0, z
c) dzc/dwS
−
[
piSθ (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− ψN
]−1 [
piSwS (θ˜
c
0, z
c)− piNwS (θ˜c0)
]
> 0. (44)
It is straightforward to verify that ∂zc/∂q in (27) is indefinite for q ∈ {k} and that piSq (θ˜, z)−piNq (θ˜)
in (35) is indefinite for q ∈ {wN , η, δ, β0, α}. Thus, their effects on (θ˜c1, θ˜c0, zc) are indefinite.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., Antra`s, P., Helpman, E., 2006. Contracts and technology adoption. American Eco-
nomic Review forthcoming.
Antra`s, P., 2005. Incomplete contracts and the product cycle. American Economic Review 95,
1054–1073.
Antra`s, P., Helpman, E., 2004. Global sourcing. Journal of Political Economy 112, 552–580.
A.T.Kearney, 2004. FDI Confidence Index. A.T.Kearney, Inc., Chicago.
27
Blomstro¨m, M., Kokko, A., 1998. Multinational corporations and spillovers. Journal of Economic
Surveys 12, 247–277.
Blomstro¨m, M., Sjo¨holm, F., 1999. Technology transfer and spillovers: Does local participation
with multinationals matter? European Economic Review 43, 915–923.
Caballero, R. J., Pindyck, R., 1996. Uncertainty, investment, and industry evolution. International
Economic Review 37, 641–662.
Cheng, L. K., Kwan, Y. K., 2000. What are the determinants of the location of foreign direct
investment? the Chinese experience. Journal of International Economics 51, 379–400.
Dixit, A., 1989. Hysteresis, import penetration, and exchange rate pass-through. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 104, 205–228.
Dixit, A., Pindyck, R., 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Feenstra, R. C., Rose, A. K., 2000. Putting things in order: Trade dynamics and product cycles.
Review of Economics and Statistics 82, 369–382.
Findlay, R., 1978. Relative backwardness, direct foreign investment, and the transfer of technology:
A simple dynamic model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 92, 1–16.
Fung, K., Lau, L. J., Lee, J., 2004. U.S. Direct Investment in China. American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research.
Globerman, S., Shapiro, D., 2002. Governance infrastructure and U.S. foreign direct investment.
Manuscript.
Griliches, Z., 1998. R&D and Productivity: the Econometric Evidence. University of Chicago,
Chicago.
Grossman, G., Helpman, E., Szeidl, A., 2005. Complementarities between outsourcing and foreign
sourcing. AEA Papers and Proceedings May, 19–24.
Head, K., Ries, J., Swenson, D., 1995. Agglomeration benefits and location choice: Evidence from
Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States. Journal of International Economics
38, 223–247.
28
Helpman, E., 2006. Trade, FDI, and the organization of firms. Journal of Economic Literature 44,
589–630.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J., Yeaple, S. R., 2004. Export versus FDI with heterogeneous firms.
American Economic Review 94, 300–316.
Javorcik, B. S., 2004. Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms?
in search of spillovers through backward linkages. American Economic Review 94, 605–627.
Keller, W., 2004. International technology diffusion. Journal of Economic Literature 42, 752–782.
Klette, T. J., 1996. R&D, scope economies, and plant performance. Rand Journal of Economics 27,
502–522.
Klette, T. J., Kortum, S., 2004. Innovating firms and aggregate innovation. Journal of Political
Economy 112, 986–1018.
Kremer, M., 1993. The o-ring theory of economic development. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
108, 551–575.
Lin, P., Saggi, K., 2002. Timing of entry under externalities. Journal of Economics 75, 211–225.
Lu, C.-H., 2007. Moving up or moving out? A unified theory of R&D, FDI, and trade. Journal of
International Economics 71, 324–343.
McDonald, R., Siegel, D., 1986. The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal of Economics
101, 707–728.
Rob, R., Vettas, N., 2003. Foreign direct investment and exports with growing demand. Review of
Economic Studies 70, 629–648.
Vernon, R., 1966. International investment and international trade in product cycle. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 80, 190–207.
Veugelers, R., Cassiman, B., 2004. Foreign subsidiaries as a channel of international technology
diffusion: Some direct firm level evidence from Belgium. European Economic Review 48, 455–
476.
29
Wei, S.-J., 2000. How taxing is corruption on international investors. Review of Economics and
Statistics 82, 1–11.
Figure 1: The Most Critical Risks to Global Operation: Year 2003/2004
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Note:
1. The survey was conducted by the A.T.Kearney, Inc. (A.T.Kearney, 2004, Figure 7).
2. The respondents are 1000 CEO’s or top managers from the world’s largest 1000 companies.
3. The numbers in the chart indicate the percentages of the total number of respondents who
consider the cited risk factor as important in their decisions to undertake global operation.
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Figure 2: piS(θ˜, z) as z varies
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Figure 3: Magnet Effect of FDI
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Figure 4: Existence and Stability of Steady State
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Figure 5: Effects of K on the Dynamics of FDI
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Figure 6: Effects of d on the Dynamics of FDI
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Figure 7: Effects of fS on the Dynamics of FDI
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Figure 8: Effects of fN on the Dynamics of FDI
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Figure 9: Effects of wS on the Dynamics of FDI
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Figure 10: Firm Productivity and FDI Timing: FDI in China by Taiwanese Electronics Firms
Firm Productivity (Return on Assets, standardized)
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Note:
1. The figure plots the timing of first time FDI undertaken by a Taiwanese firm in mainland China
against the firm’s productivity level. The data source is described in the text.
2. The productivity level of a firm is measured by the ratio of Return on Assets. The average of
the ratios from 1991 to 1993 is used.
3. The productivity levels of all firms are standardized by the sample’s mean and standard error.
4. The timing of a firm’s initial FDI in mainland China is measured by the number of quarters
elapsed since 1991 following the Taiwanese government’s lift of its ban on outward FDI to mainland
China.
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